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Introduction 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have in recent years been presented as among the most 
potent legal instruments underwriting economic globalization.1 The treaties grant foreign 
investors a right to file international arbitration claims directly against governments 
without first having exhausted local remedies. If governments refuse to participate in the 
proceedings, or chose not to comply with an arbitral award, investors are allowed to 
confiscate their commercial property in most corners of the world, with only limited 
options for courts in enforcing states to refuse execution. Combined with their wide scope 
of administrative review, this dispute-settlement mechanism makes BITs uniquely 
powerful in an international law context. As foreign investors have realized this over the 
last decade and a half, particularly developing country governments have been on the 
respondent end of an increasing number of investment treaty arbitrations, which have 
resulted in awards of hundreds of millions of dollars and often involved sensitive areas of 
public regulation. Thus is has become increasingly clear that adopting BITs entails 
considerable risks. 
But while almost every developing country has adopted at least a few BITs, the question is 
whether they truly realized that by consenting to investment treaty arbitration, they were 
exposing themselves to the risk of costly litigation? Practically all studies on BIT-
formation are based on the assumption that developing countries understood the potential 
costs of the treaties, when the modern network of BITs was established during the 1990s.2 
But when BITs with investor-state arbitration clauses proliferated rapidly, hardly any 
claims had indicated that they actually had a tangible impact on investor-state relations.  
The rise in investment treaty claims has therefore led to spatially and temporally dispersed 
arrival of important information about the potential costs of BITs. Combined with the fact 
that participation is a repeated decision for states, this provides a unique opportunity to 
                                                          
1
 E.g. Van Harten 2007; Schneiderman 2008; Montt 2009; Schill 2009. 
2
 E.g. Guzman 1998; Elkins, Simmons, and Guzman 2006, 825; Montt 2009, 128; Blake 2010; Büthe and 
Milner 2009; Allee and Peinhardt 2010; Bergstrand and Egger 2011. For exceptions, see Van Harten 2010, 
42-46; Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield 2011. Note that BITs were signed from the late 1950s, but only 
from the late 1980s did they include a legally binding consent to investor-state arbitration; Yackee 2008. See 
also below. 
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study not just how governments have responded to the rise of investment arbitrations but 
also, more broadly, how they learn about the impact of their (economic) policies.   
The latter question has been dealt with in the literature on policy learning, which seeks to 
understand the processes whereby policy makers change beliefs as a result of observing 
and interpreting experiences, which in turn may lead to corresponding policy changes.3 
The most prominent learning model in this literature is Bayesian updating. Here, 
governments learn about policies by weighing their prior beliefs (e.g. the prudence of 
signing BITs) against the quantity and quality of observed experience (e.g. the liabilities 
involved in investment treaty arbitration).4 An alternative view of policy learning comes 
out of the literature on bounded rationality. Here again, policy-makers are seen as goal-
oriented, and thereby rational in the broadest sense of the word. But rather than the laws of 
statistics, policy learning is biased by cognitive shortcuts consistently found in 
experimental studies on human judgments and decision-making.5  
In the context of international political economy (IPE) literature, as well as international 
relations more broadly, the second view on policy learning has received only scant 
attention. This may be appropriate, if models of bounded rationality sacrifice theoretical 
parsimony without leading to new and important insights. On the other hand, if insights on 
bounded rationality can in fact most elegantly explain systematic variation in how 
countries learn about their economic policies, perhaps it is time to include them among the 
standard theoretical arsenal of international relations literature.  
To contribute to this question, the BIT-regime provides an excellent case study. Firstly, in 
contrast to the diffusion of revolutions and other path-breaking policy innovations recently 
studied from a bounded rationality perspective by Kurt Weyland,6 the decision to enter into 
BITs has not been a one-off event for the individual country, but rather a sequential, or 
evolutionary, process taking place over decades. The time pressure has been minimal, and 
if not satisfied with their initial decision, states did not have to continue since they weren’t 
                                                          
3
 E.g. Levy 1994. 
4
 ‘Quality’ here refers to the variability, or consistency, of available outcome information. See generally, 
Meseguer 2009. 
5
 See generally, Jones and Baumgartner 2005. 
6
 Weyland 2006, 2009, 2010. 
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coerced into joining the BIT-movement.7 This makes the BIT movement a hard case for a 
bounded rationality framework. 
Secondly, while some foreign policy studies in the security realm have applied insights on 
bounded rationality,8 the politics of investment treaties is not characterised by the same 
extent of pressure and emotions as in military conflict, and actors are thereby less prone to 
be influenced by biasing heuristics. For this reason as well, the BIT movement is a hard 
case.  
Third, Meseguer has argued, convincingly, that applying bounded rationality insights to the 
study of international economic policies does not necessarily lead to predictions, which 
could not also be explained by a Bayesian framework.9 Yet, we will show that the bilateral 
nature of BITs offers a quantifiable prediction of the bounded rational learning model, 
which is not observationally equivalent to that of Bayesian learning.  
The paper is divided into four sections. Based on the observation that BITs involve high-
impact, low-probability costs, the first section will outline our two main competing 
hypotheses based on rational learning and bounded rational learning. The second will 
present qualitative insights from policy-makers ‘on the ground’ for whether, and how, the 
rise of investment treaty arbitration has had an impact on developing countries’ willingness 
to enter into BITs. Our focus is on developing countries, as they have been subject to the 
vast majority of disputes.10 Building on these insights, the third section offers an 
econometric analysis on the impact of investment arbitrations on developing countries’ 
propensity to adopt BITs. Both the qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that 
many developing country officials have been bounded rational when learning about BITs 
by ignoring the risks of BITs until hit by their first claim. The fourth section considers two 
potential alternative explanations for the behaviour we observe. Most importantly, this 
leads us to identify a prediction which is unique to a bounded rationality approach, and test 
it using an augmented version of the dataset from Elkins, Guzman and Simmons’ (EGS) 
                                                          
7
 Alvarez 2011, ch. 2. 
8
 Jervis 1976; Reiter 1996; Vertzberger 1998. 
9
 Meseguer 2006. 
10
 As discussed in the conclusion, the learning process could very well have been different for developed 
countries. 
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highly influential paper on BIT-diffusion.11 Finally, we conclude by discussing how our 
evidence is of relevance not just to studies of the investment regime, but also for other 
areas of IPE.   
 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to stress that although the paper provides 
important hints as to why developing countries signed BITs - some of which seriously 
question underlying assumptions in existing accounts - this is not its main aim. Rather than 
offering a general account of the BIT-movement, we use it as a case-study to understand 
the broader question of how governments process information about the implications of 
their economic policies. 
1. Learning about high-impact, low-probability events: the case 
of investment treaty arbitration 
 
The starting point for our analysis of policy-learning is the observation that as the number 
of investment treaty arbitrations has grown; BIT-participation has slowed down 
considerably (figure 1).12 While we know that the claims have led some countries to clarify 
and restrict the scope of their BITs - as even developed countries have been surprised 
about the potential breadth of key BIT-standards13 - we ask a simpler question; namely 
how the rise of investment treaty arbitration has affected governments’ decision to 
participate in BITs.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 EGS 2006. 
12
 The exception is 2001, which is likely due to UNCTAD’s intense promotion of investment treaties that 
year, which resulted in  more than 70 signed at various ‘signing sessions’; UNCTAD 2002. The slowdown is 
clear also if one considers that some countries today prefer free trade agreements with investment chapters 
over BITs: in 2008, for instance, only 7 investment protection treaties other than BITs were signed, bringing 
the total number of investment treaties up to 81– less than half of what was signed just ten years before. 
13
 UNCTAD 2007; Yannacka-Small 2008, ftn. 9 (‘As was the case with the majority of BIT provisions, 
second thoughts only began to arise when arbitral tribunals began to shed light on these provisions.’)  
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Figure 1: BITs signed per year and total number of BIT claims 
 
Is it a coincidence that the rush to sign BITs slowed down as the treaties’ adjudication 
mechanism became operational in practise?14 And if it is not merely a result of saturation 
of relevant treaties to be signed,15 how have developing country governments processed 
information about the risks of BITs revealed by the claims? 
In order to understand whether, and how, the rise in arbitration claims has made countries 
learn about the risks of BITs, we first need to consider the nature of those risks. For while 
BITs have exposed some countries to costly arbitration proceedings with sometimes far-
reaching ramifications, the probability that a given treaty would result in a claim was, until 
recently, very small. When modern BITs diffused rapidly during the 1990s, the decision to 
enter into the treaties was thereby an example of a policy that entailed costs with a high 
impact but a low probability.  
When faced with low-probability events, a rational learner would be particularly careful to 
factor in the experiences of others. Per definition, low-probability events are unlikely to be 
part of a decision-maker’s immediate past experiences. And since the costs of ignoring 
information are larger if it is the only information available, this makes decision-makers’ 
                                                          
14
 Aaken 2010, 550. 
15
 This has been suggested by Saban, Bonomo, and Stier-Moses 2010.  
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own experiences with low-probability events the ‘teacher of fools’.16 So whether policy 
learning is a horizontal process – i.e. learning directly from other countries – or it is 
channeled through intermediaries, such as international organizations,17 a rational 
government should carefully consider information revealed about the risks of BITs, when 
other countries become subject to investment treaty disputes.  
An alternative explanation for the slow-down in BIT participation comes out of the 
bounded rationality literature. This suggests that rather than considering all relevant and 
available information, decision-makers tend to rely mostly on whatever information is 
salient at a given time.18 So although information was easily available to developing about 
claims against other countries,19 learning about the potential costs of the treaties may have 
been skewed by the application of the “availability heuristic”. This refers to the tendency 
of people to evaluate the probability of events based on the ease with which relevant 
instances come to mind.20 While obviously a useful cognitive shortcut in many instances, 
this can also have a biasing impact on people’s judgments and behaviour, as it may lead to 
ignoring information that is relevant and attaching great value to some that is not.21  
The availability heuristic is particularly important in cases such as ours because people 
tend to show bimodal responses to low-probability events: some greatly exaggerate them, 
and others assume they can ignore them completely, and the choice between the two 
reactions depends on the extent to which people can bring specific and ‘vivid’ instances to 
mind.22 In the absence of highly ‘available’ information decision-makers thereby often fail 
to consider low-probability events fully until lightning strikes.23 As hinted to above, this 
implies that while ‘muddling through’ and ‘satisficing’ may often be useful for bounded 
                                                          
16
 March 2010. 
17
 E.g. Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 797-798. 
18
 E.g. Weyland 2006. 
19
 Most claims have been pursued under ICSID, where the Secretariat continuously kept its members 
informed about disputes before the centre both through publications as well as its technical advice. The 
United Nations also regularly sent out publications to member states on the potency of international 
investment agreements; e.g. UNCTC 1988; UNCTAD 1998, 1999. Note also that while BIT-claims began in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, non-state actors have occasionally used international law to pursue compensation 
claims against host governments since the inter-war period; see generally Parlett 2011, ch. 2.  
20
 Tversky and Kahneman 1973. See also, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006; Weyland 2006, 2009, 2010. 
21
 Johnson et al. 2000. 
22
 McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993; Slovic et al. 2000, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 2000a. 
23
 Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; Kunreuther et al. 2002. 
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rational actors, they are particularly imprudent decision-strategies when learning about 
low-probability events as it can lead to optimism bias.24 For instance, just as repeated safe 
driving experiences can lead people to never wear seat belts if they fail to consider the 
experiences of others,25 an absence of investment treaty claims against a government in the 
past could lead to the misunderstanding that BITs may be far-reaching in theory but entail 
no risks in practice. 
This is an important difference in the predictions of the two perspectives on policy 
learning: whereas rational policy-makers are expected to learn from all relevant 
experiences, policy-makers that apply inferential shortcuts when interpreting information 
are expected to learn much more from their own experiences, as that information is more 
readily available. This type of ‘narcissistic learning’ is therefore our second hypothesis for 
why we observe a slowdown in BIT participation. Just as individuals tend to insure against 
low-probability events after they have already been injured themselves,26 developing 
countries may have displayed similar behavior in the investment regime by only seriously 
considering the risks of BITs, when they became subject to a BIT-claim themselves. 
Moreover, rather than merely underestimating the risks of BITs due to imperfect 
information, as could be explained by Bayesian learning, a bounded rationality framework 
implies that the risks were entirely ignored until hit by a claim.  
Below we consider these two main hypotheses based on both micro-level evidence in the 
shape of a case-study, survey data, as well as macro-level quantitative evidence.  
2. Qualitative evidence 
The case of Pakistan 
As a first cut to investigate just how developing countries have learned about the 
implications of the investment treaty policies, we begin by briefly reviewing the case of 
Pakistan. Pakistan is useful for our purposes as it has participated in BITs for half a 
century, since it signed the first ever BIT with Germany in 1959. Also, Pakistan has signed 
                                                          
24
 Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; Slovic, Kunreuther, and White 2000, 27. 
25
 Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 2000b. 
26
 Steinbrugge, McClure and Snow 1969. 
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numerous BITs since the early 1990s which allow investors direct recourse to investor-
state arbitration, and governments in Pakistan have thereby had more than amble 
opportunities to learn about the implications of such treaties.   
The first treaty-based investor-state arbitration against Pakistan was filed by a Swiss 
investor in 2001.27 But while several investment treaty claims had been filed up through 
the 1990s questioning a wide range of government conduct, and Pakistan had been made 
explicitly aware of the potency of the treaties,28 the claim in 2001 took everyone within the 
Pakistani bureaucracy by complete surprise. When learning about the dispute, Pakistan’s 
Attorney General - one of the most learned experts on international public law in South 
Asia - actually had to look up ‘BITs’ and ‘ICSID’ on Google. And when inquiring with the 
relevant ministries, hardly any records existed of Pakistan’s past BIT-negotiations with 
Switzerland. There were no files or documentation in any of the responsible ministries, and 
no indication that the treaty had ever been discussed in Parliament. In fact, the treaty itself 
was nowhere to be found, and the government had to request a copy from Switzerland 
through formal channels. For a legal instrument with such a considerable scope, this was 
somewhat of a mystery. Yet, the Swiss treaty was no exception, as hardly any records 
existed of Pakistan’s past BIT-negotiations. This was not because they were considered too 
sensitive to document in written form. On the contrary, numerous interviews with current 
and past officials in Pakistan’s BIT-negotiators confirm that when foreign delegations had 
come to the country, or the Pakistani leadership went abroad, BITs had merely been 
considered a piece of paper, something for the press - a token of goodwill.29 While there 
was an expectation that the treaties would lead to increased inflows of investment, 
government files today admit that: ‘BITs were initially instruments that were signed during 
visits of high level delegations to provide for photo opportunities…’30 It was thereby not 
until Pakistan was hit by a multi-million dollar arbitration claim that officials actually 
                                                          
27
 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13. 
28
 Apart from reports provided by international organizations (see infra note 18), even a major Pakistani 
newspaper ran a series of articles on investment treaties written by a senior ICSID official; Parra 1996.   
29
 Apart from the former Attorney General, interviews covered the Board of Investment, Pakistan’s Embassy 
in Washington DC, the Ministry of Industries and Production, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Law, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Reserve Bank, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Interviews 
were made in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad, January 2009 to August 2010. 
30 Communication between Pakistan’s Board of Investment and Ministry of Law concerning re-negotiation of 
German-Pakistan BIT, November 23, 2009. On file with authors.  
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realized the implications of treaties signed by successive governments since 1959. In the 
following years, the Pakistani bureaucracy blocked numerous ongoing negotiations, 
including one with the United States. And while some embassies, politicians, and 
investment promotion officials are still pushing for Pakistan to sign BITs, some corners of 
the bureaucracy are now making the government aware that the treaties involve serious and 
far-reaching obligations. This politicization of BITs is a first in Pakistan’s history. 
The case of Pakistan thereby provides preliminary evidence in favor of our bounded 
rational learning hypothesis. It indicates that the risk of BITs were not just underestimated 
up through the 1990s, as could potentially be explained by a Bayesian framework due to 
imperfect information, instead they were ignored completely. And rather than learning 
from other countries’ experiences, it had to take a claim against Pakistan itself for the 
bureaucracy to realize the potency of the treaties. 
A survey 
The experiences of Pakistan may of course be unique, so we proceed by surveying a 
broader sample of developing countries. From January 2009 to May 2011 thirty interviews 
were conducted with officials from thirteen developing countries (excl. Pakistan) from all 
corners of the world. By 2009, all countries had been respondents in at least one BIT-
claim. Table 1 lists key sample statistics from the year the BIT-movement was at its peak, 
1996. While spread over each region, sample countries are generally richer and had much 
larger inward and outward FDI stocks than most other developing countries. This is 
important as the opposite pattern could have slanted the sample in favour of a bounded 
rationality explanation (e.g. lack of expertise, lack of stake in the system; see also below). 
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  Share of total   Average   Median 
Inward FDI stock   
  
  
  
  
  Sample 24% 
  
13.52 
  
6.35 
  Developing countries 100% 
  
4.60 
  
0.55 
            
Outward FDI stock   
  
  
  
  
  Sample 28% 
  
4.20 
  
0.73 
  Developing countries 100% 
  
1.78 
  
0.11 
            
GDP   
  
  
  
  
  Sample 17% 
  
77.41 
  
23.34 
  Developing countries 100%   41.77   5.37 
Note: All figures are in current bn. USD. Sample covers four countries from Asia, five from 
Latin America, two from Eastern Europe, and two from Africa.  
Sources: UNCTAD and World Development Indicators. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of developing countries where one or more officials 
were interviewed, 1996 
 
Two types of officials were interviewed: negotiators and stakeholders.31 The latter, refers 
to officials from government agencies whose discretion could be curtailed by BITs, and 
thereby had an incentive to take a somewhat cautious approach towards the treaties. Only 
negotiators who themselves were involved in past negotiations were included in the 
sample. Similarly, only stakeholders who were involved in investment protection policies 
during the 1990s were included. All interviews were semi-structured with the overall 
theme being the countries’ experiences with negotiating and ratifying investment treaties.  
Practically all officials – incl. stakeholders - noted that they were unaware of the far-
reaching scope and implications of BITs during the 1990s, when the treaties proliferated. 
Although some did consider the standards on expropriation, for instance, few realized that 
the treaties had such a considerable reach and were enforceable not just in principle but 
also in fact. This contrasts with standard accounts of BIT-diffusion yet is not too surprising 
given the lack of disputes at the time, which is likely to have led developing countries – 
and others - to underestimate the risks of the treaties due to a lack of information (see 
above). However, officials did not simply underestimate the risks of disputes; instead many 
                                                          
31
 In most countries, the negotiation of BITs during the 1990s was done by very few officials – typically only 
one - as the treaties were almost completely ‘de-politicized.’ As one Latin American official noted, ‘during 
the 1990s, BITs were a very different animal than FTAs, the WTO, and other globalization instruments. … By 
contrast with FTA agreements, there was no legal review, control, or scrutiny to the content. … Often BIT 
negotiations have been done by a couple of guys; they sent it to parliament with no real discussion… Apart 
from a copy of the BIT in the negotiator’s office no one was even aware how many BITs the country had in 
the 1990s.’ Interview with Mexican official, London, 26 May 2010. 
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ignored such risks and thereby treated BITs as one out of a long list of diplomatic gestures 
without any practical implications apart from helping to attract foreign investments. In 12 
out of 13 countries interviewed, respondents thus noted that it was not until the first claim 
was filed against their country that stakeholders realized that BITs exposed them to serious 
liabilities (Table 2). In fact, in 8 out of 13 cases even negotiators did not realize that BITs 
involved far-reaching and enforceable obligations until their own country was hit by a 
claim.32 While learning did take place on occasion, for instance through UNCTAD’s 
training courses, the response from one Eastern European negotiator was representative: 
‘Negotiators really didn't know that the treaties had any bite in practice. They were neither 
aware of the costs or the fact that it could lead to arbitration.’33 So was the response from 
the Dominican Republic, where it was the first claim against the country in 2007 that made 
officials realise the potency of BITs: ‘this led to a complete halt in negotiations, as we 
became aware we are legally liable.’34  
 
  
Percentage of 
countries 
Stakeholders had not realised before first claim that BIT-obligations were far-
reaching and enforceable 92 
Stakeholders and negotiators had not realised before first claim that BIT-
obligations were far-reaching and enforceable 62 
Source: 30 interviews with officials from thirteen developing countries conducted by one of the authors 
from January 2009 to May 2011. Officials were involved in BIT-negotiations currently or in the past, 
directly or from a management position. 
Note:  Sample covers four countries from Asia, five from Latin America, two from Eastern Europe, and 
two from Africa. Sample countries are generally richer than average developing countries and cover some 
of the greatest recipients and exporters of foreign capital. All countries had by 2009 been respondents in at 
least one BIT-claim. 
Table 2. Developing countries learning from their first BIT-claim.    
 
These findings are consistent with some of the few developing country experiences which 
have been discussed in public. For instance, a senior official notes that until Thailand was 
first sued in 2004, ‘the realisation that an investor could invoke investor-state dispute 
                                                          
32
 Investment treaties with the United States and Canada were somewhat different, as they included 
liberalization provisions, the implications of which were quite clear to negotiators and stakeholders.  
33
 Interview with Czech official, Copenhagen, 28 April 2010.  
34
 Interview with Dominican Republic official, Copenhagen, 17 May 2011 
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settlement in a treaty was perhaps not fully appreciated.’35 Similarly, in South Africa a recent 
government report notes that negotiators and stakeholders did not realize during the 1990s 
that the treaties had serious legal implications for the country, and not until South Africa 
came on the respondent end of a major claim in the early 2000s were the treaties taken 
seriously.36 After this, senior officials in South Africa decided to considerably slow down 
the country’s BIT-participation – particularly with developed countries.37 
Similarly, there are indications that countries which have not been subject to BIT disputes 
still have a much more haphazard BIT policy than those that have. For instance, in his case 
study of India – a country otherwise so careful to guard its sovereignty – Ranjan notes that 
since BITs have not had adverse implications for the country thus far, stakeholders still 
assume they have no impact on India’s regulatory flexibility.38 Also, in the case of Libya 
this is a report on the BIT signed with Spain during Qadhafi’s visit there in 2007: 
‘… the Government of Libya (GOL) indicated … that it wished to quickly finalize language 
for an education and culture agreement, a defense cooperation agreement, a bilateral legal 
cooperation and extradition treaty, an investment security agreement and a double taxation-
exemption agreement. … [A Spanish official, ed.] lamented that the rush to finalize 
agreements for signature in time for Qadhafi’s visit had precluded meaningful bilateral 
discussions of what the two sides’ understanding of those accords would mean and how they 
would be implemented.’39 
 
The pattern is as expected: at the time, Libya had not been reported on the respondent end 
of an investment treaty claim, and it still rushed through the treaties alongside all sorts of 
other diplomatic agreements, such as on education and cultural exchanges, without any 
‘meaningful bilateral discussions’. As the Spanish official remarked, ‘The form is more 
important to the GOL than the substance.’40 This was as late as 2007, when almost 300 
BIT claims had already been filed.  
 
                                                          
35
  Mangklatanakul 2011, 82. 
36
 DTI 2010.  
37
 See further in Poulsen 2011, ch. 9.  
38
 Ranjan 2012. Note, that BITs were used by foreign investors in the Dabhol claims against India, yet the 
dispute was primarily a commercial arbitration claim. 
39
 ‘Qadhafi’s travel to Spain,’ Report by American Embassy in Tripoli, 12 December 2007; Wikileaks - 
07TRIPOLI1033.  
40
 Ibid.  
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Naturally, it is important to stress that in some countries there were officials already in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s who realized that BITs subjected their country to enforceable 
and potentially far-reaching obligations. But these were the exception, not the rule. As 
Christoph Schreuer noted in his expert testimony in Wintershall v. Argentina:  
 
‘…on the occasion of state visits when the heads of states need something to sign … the 
typical two candidates in a situation like that are Bilateral Investment Treaties, and treaties 
for cultural co-operation. … they are very often not negotiated at all, they are just being put 
on the table, and I have heard several representatives who have actually been active in this 
Treaty-making process … say that, ‘We had no idea that this would have real consequences 
in the real world’.’41  
 
The sections above confirm this observation. Unlike assumptions in standard accounts of 
the BIT-movement, many – perhaps most - developing country governments did not 
engage in sophisticated cost-benefit considerations but rather failed to even consider the 
risks of the treaties until they were hit by their first claim.  
All in all, these qualitative findings provide evidence in favor of a bounded rational 
learning process and to further sustain this conclusion we proceed by triangulating the 
qualitative findings with quantitative evidence on BIT participation.  
3. Quantitative evidence 
 
Figure 2 uses an ‘event study’ to provide a preliminary visual assessment of the hypothesis 
that participation responded principally to claims against themselves. The y-axis shows the 
average annual number of BITs signed or ratified by developing countries which have had 
at least one BIT-based claim brought to arbitration. The x-axis shows time relative to the 
year of registration of the first BIT claim against the country in discrete (annual) intervals.  
 
                                                          
41
 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/14, Award, 8 Dec., 2008, par 85. 
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Figure 2. BIT participation around time of first claim  
 
 
The pattern corresponds with the survey findings: while signing rates were already 
decreasing on average prior to the time of first claim, this downward trend amplified 
considerably after the claim was registered. Even more notable is that the upward trend in 
number of BITs ratified per year reverses in the year of the first claim.42 
 
Yet, as supportive as Figure 2 is, we may still be concerned that the correlation between 
experience of a claim and decreased BIT participation is a spurious one, driven by omitted 
variables such as global shocks, changing norms towards foreign investors and investment 
treaties, national political or economic environment, and participation dynamics (such as 
the exhaustion of treaty-partner possibilities). To address these concerns we turn to the 
tools of econometrics.43 
 
                                                          
42
 Note that while it was irrational to entirely ignore the risks of BITs until hit by a claim, we are not arguing 
that the sizeable drop in BIT-participation is necessarily a rational response – in fact, a prediction from the 
bounded rationality literature would be that it could be overly drastic. Similarly, we are not arguing that 
entering into BITs is inherently irrational and therefore do not expect adoption to reach zero after the claim, 
particularly as developing countries are increasingly becoming capital exporters themselves and certain 
government agencies are bound to continue pushing for the treaties (cf. the case of Pakistan). 
43
 The model proposed by Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield (2011) is an example of an alternative 
explanation which is consistent with Figure 2 but cannot explain our regression results below. 
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Our country-year panel data includes observations for 138 developing or transition 
countries over the years 1990-2009. For our purposes, we understand a developing or 
transition economy (henceforth merely referred to as developing countries) as one that the 
World Bank does not classify as a “high-income” country for the majority of our sample 
period. Apart from Western countries, this definition excludes countries such as South 
Korea, Singapore, and several Arab oil-exporting states. Although these countries have 
signed numerous treaties with Western countries, their role in BIT negotiations is arguably 
often that of capital exporters - particularly when negotiating with low-income countries.44  
 
Based on the interview findings above, our principle empirical hypothesis is that of 
bounded rationality, i.e. that developing countries only tended to strongly decrease their 
participation in BITs in response to experiencing a BIT arbitration claim against 
themselves. We examine the statistical validity of this hypothesis by estimating the 
Negative Binomial fixed-effects model of Hausman, Hall, and Griliches,45 with dependent 
and independent variables as in equation 1.   
 
Our parameter of interest in equation 1 is ϕ . 
( ) ( ))exp(,|1 tititititit XBITClaimgXBITClaimBITsf ηαϕ ++=+  (1)  
Where 1+itBITs  is the number of new BITs participated in year t+1, 
itBITClaim is a dummy variable which is zero in years before the first BIT claim was 
lodged against country i, and 1 otherwise, 
itX comprises FDI inflows, net FDI outflows, GDP, the investment risk index, and 
controls for previous BIT participation, 
tη are year effects, and 
itε are idiosyncratic errors. 
 
In the subsequent subheadings we discuss in detail each of the variables in equation 1, as 
well as our choice of estimator for the regression equation. Before proceeding with this, 
                                                          
44
 Salacuse 1990. 
45
 Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984. 
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however, it is worth noting that the structure of our regression approach differs from that in 
the leading models of BIT participation.46 Our panel dataset is intentionally constructed of 
country-year observations, while the earlier papers have used country-pair (i.e. dyad)-year 
data. The dyad-year approach was necessary for comprehensive models of BIT 
participation which sought to test hypotheses about the impact on BIT formation of the 
relationship between treaty partners (e.g. income differences, colonial relations). In 
contrast, our hypotheses of interest are country-level. For this the dyad-year structure is not 
necessary. Furthermore, in the interest of space, we intentionally avoided the dyad-year 
models in order to keep our analysis focussed on our hypotheses of interest and avoid 
discussion of the many other variables included in the dyadic models. However, as a 
robustness check and to provide comparison with existing literature, we show that our 
results also hold using the dyadic data and models of EGS and Jandhyala, Henisz, and 
Mansfield (JHM).47 The fact that our findings remain consistent across three different 
datasets and econometric approaches speaks strongly to the robustness of our result. As we 
discuss in Section 4, using the frameworks of EGS and JHM also allows us to demonstrate 
an auxiliary result which strengthens our conclusions regarding bounded rationality.  
 
Dependent variable(s) 
Based on UNCTAD’s country-lists of BITs, our main dependent variable counts the 
number of BITs signed by a developing country in a given year. This is a standard measure 
for quantitative studies on the diffusion of BITs.48 It is based on the simplified, yet 
reasonable, assumption that BITs are comparable in their substantive and procedural 
provisions.49 One aspect where BITs do systematically and meaningfully vary, however, is 
in their dispute settlement provisions, since it wasn’t until the late 1980s that BITs began, 
as a general rule, to give investors access to investor-state arbitration without first having 
                                                          
46
 EGS 2006; Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield 2011. 
47
 The EGS robustness check is presented in Section 4. The same exercise is repeated using the data and 
econometric approach of JHM in the Appendix. 
48
 E.g. EGS 2006. 
49
 The content of BITs is largely similar, and although some recent studies have coded BITs’ content (Yackee 
2008; Alle and Peinhardt 2010), they remain too restrictive or cover too few treaties to be useful for our 
purposes. Also, even when differences exist, they are often leveled out by the MFN provision, which 
combined with BITs’ often broad definition of investors and investments provide ample opportunities for 
‘treaty-shopping,’ which makes differences between BITs even less relevant in practice; Legum 2006; Schill 
2009.  
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to exhaust local remedies.50 Although occasionally overlooked by international relations 
contributions,51 this difference is crucial as investment treaties would be largely irrelevant 
for foreign investors without their effective and comprehensive consent to investor-state 
arbitration.52 We therefore restrict our sample to the period when the vast majority of BITs 
included a binding consent to investor-state arbitration, namely from 1990 onwards.  
To check the robustness of our results we also use two alternative measures of BIT 
participation. The first is the number of BITs that came into force in a given year (hereafter 
referred to as ‘ratified BITs’). The advantage of this measure is that it captures the 
propensity to enter into BITs which are actually legally binding, while the disadvantage is 
that idiosyncratic ratification processes introduce measurement error.53  
Our final measure of BIT participation is the number of BITs signed by a developing 
country in a given year which came into force (i.e. were ‘ratified’) within three years of 
being signed. Though novel, this measure combines the key strengths of each of the 
measures of participation commonly used in the literature. Like ‘ratified’ BITs, this 
alternative measure of participation has the advantage of not counting BITs which 
countries sign without the intention of making them legally binding. Similarly to ‘signed 
BITs’, this measure avoids the measurement error introduced in the ‘ratified BITs’ 
measure by idiosyncrasies in the (often lengthy) ratification process in each country. We 
chose three years as our cutoff as more than four fifths of BITs that have entered into force 
did so within three years of signature.54 
Main explanatory variable 
Our explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
beginning the year a country was subject to its first BIT-claim – defined as the year the 
                                                          
50
 Yackee 2008. 
51
 E.g. EGS 2006; JHM 2011.  
52
 Wälde 2005. It is unclear from arbitral decisions, to what extent investors can use MFN clauses to ‘import’ 
more favourable dispute settlement provisions from other treaties (Hsu 2006). This makes the specific 
wording of arbitration provisions particularly important to assess the protection granted in individual BITs.  
53
 The vast majority of BITs come into force after the contracting parties have notified each other that their 
domestic requirements are met. Such requirements vary across countries, but in practice this often means that 
both national parliaments have to ratify the BIT before it enters into force. 
54
 UNCTAD 2006. 
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claim was registered by the arbitral tribunal - and zero otherwise.55 While our base 
regression includes only the relatively simple “first claim” dummy variable, we also 
considered more refined measures of BIT-claim experience, including: the number of 
claims a country has faced, the size of the award sought by the investor, BIT-related claims 
brought under other legal jurisdiction, and whether the host ‘lost’ the case. None of these 
refinements affect the base result – a finding which lends further support to our bounded 
rationality hypothesis.56 
Other control variables 
A key component of our identification strategy is the inclusion of a full set of year 
dummies to control for global shocks shared by all countries, such as business cycles, 
changing global norms towards foreign capital (e.g. the rise and fall of the Washington 
Consensus), the global number of BITs, or the global number of BIT claims. Controlling 
for global BIT claims in this way means that the effects we observe are additional to any 
effect of claims against other countries. Thus if countries treated claims against other 
countries as being as informative as claims against themselves, or if they were merely 
responding to a secular shift in BIT-participation norms as suggested by JHM, we would 
expect to find zero effect from our variable of interest (own BIT claims).  
 
Our base model also controls for a country’s FDI inflows and outflows as well as its 
market size/level of economic development proxied by GDP. We control for these macro-
economic flows to account for the fact that the level of foreign investor interest in the host 
                                                          
55
 The variable may have a small amount of measurement error, as the secrecy of some disputes adjudicated 
under non-ICSID rules, means we can’t be entirely sure when a country was hit by a BIT-claim for the first 
time. However, the vast majority of investment treaty awards have found their way to the public domain. 
Furthermore, even if we are missing the first claims for a few countries, it would make our results more 
conservative i.e. bias against finding an effect of the first treaty claim. Similarly, while the year a country 
was subject to its first BIT-claim is not necessarily the year it was first threatened with a claim, this also 
makes it more difficult to find an effect from first BIT-claims and therefore biases against evidence for 
bounded rational learning. Finally, a claim indicates the relevance of BITs for investment protection, and is 
therefore likely to lead to increased lobbying for BIT-formation by foreign investors not covered by treaty 
protections; so this too will make it less likely to find an effect of the first claim.     
56
 The result regarding number of claims is in table 5, those for size and jurisdiction are in table A.3 in the 
Appendix. The result for ‘losing’ a claim is available in request from the authors but  is not presented here as 
this variable is subject to significant measurement error due to out-of-court settlements, the many pending 
cases, as well as methodological concerns in construing a quantitative measure for when countries have 
actually ‘lost’ a claim. 
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may affect the number of BITs it can choose to sign.57 We further control for investment 
risks (using the Political Risk Services Group Index), as a government with protectionist 
urges towards FDI may both be in higher risk of BIT-claims and at the same time less 
inclined to sign BITs. All of these explanatory variables are lagged one year to avoid 
simultaneity.  
 
Finally we include a range of indicators to control for saturation, i.e. the fact that a 
slowdown in a country’s BIT participation can be a function of the size of its existing BIT-
network. Since a more extensive BIT network will also raise the probability of a claim 
(ceteris paribus) omitting previous participation would likely lead us to over-estimate the 
downward effects of claims. We therefore control for a cubic polynomial function of the 
cumulative number of BITs participated in (measured by signing or ratification according 
to the dependent variable in the regression). Additionally, since claims only arise from 
ratified BITs, we control for the cumulative number of BITs ratified with four and ten year 
lags in all estimations.   
 
Summary statistics and sources all raw and constructed variables used in our analysis are 
provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Missing data for some series means that our base 
regression uses around 1600 of the potential 2740 observations. 
 
Additional robustness tests 
Apart from robustness check to choice of estimator and specification of both the dependent 
and main explanatory variable, we also checked of the robustness of our findings to adding 
or removing other control variables. For instance, we removed – one at a time - any of the 
controls in our base regression which might potentially be endogenous or cause other 
forms of bias. Also, we checked the robustness of our results to the inclusion of two 
additional controls. Firstly, using the World Bank’s database on political institutions,58 we 
captured possible partisan biases by including a dummy variable indicating whether a 
                                                          
57
 For example, controlling for FDI flows means that our results will not be biased by any decreased investor 
interest in the host which the work of Allee and Peinhardt (2011) suggests may be caused by BIT claims. 
58
 Beck et al. 2001. 
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country’s executive and/or majority party was left-wing. Secondly, we checked for 
whether a country’s BITs have been used to adjudicate claims against other countries: for 
while only few developing country investors have filed BIT-claims, the rising stocks of 
investment from developing countries mean they increasingly have an interest in not just 
attracting investment from the West but also protect their own investors abroad. In the 
interest of space we do not present these results here, however, as neither control had any 
appreciable explanatory power or impact on other coefficients.59 
Augmented models and ancillary questions 
As many countries experienced their first investment treaty claim around the same time, 
we include specifications which control for cross-border learning effects by including 
dummy variables for whether a country within the same region has been hit. This is a much 
simpler approach than EGS, for instance, who include complex (and highly data 
dependent) diffusion measures based on ambitious assumptions of highly advanced BIT-
strategies.60 Based on our interviews, we are less optimistic about the sophistication of 
developing country strategies in the international investment regime and therefore limit 
learning effects to countries within the same region. Note again, however, that any 
observed impact of this variable is over and above the impact of the global number of 
claims (i.e. also claims far away).    
Finally, we studied specifications which distinguish between BIT partners. For although 
BITs are largely comparable in their legal content, hundreds of BITs have been signed 
between countries which exchange next to zero investment flows. While legally binding, 
and at times relevant through the MFN provision, these treaties are rarely important in 
practice. Similarly, since by far the majority of claims (still) involve Western investors 
suing developing country governments, we distinguish between North-South and South-
South BITs. We also use an alternative classification, where only South-South treaties 
                                                          
59
 Results available from the authors upon request.  
60
 EGS 2006. 
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which do not have a major developing country capital exporter as one of the contracting 
parties are considered ‘frivolous’ BITs.61  
Results 
Table 3 reports coefficients from our base specification. The dependent variables from left 
to right are respectively the annual number of BITs signed, ratified, and signed and then 
ratified within 3 years. In all three columns the effect of having at least one BIT claim is 
negative and we are able to reject the null of positive or no effect at the 5% significance 
level or better.62 The experience of a BIT claim reduces signing by around 35% and 
ratification by somewhat less with around 17%.63 This provides strong support for our 
hypothesis that when a country is subject to at least one BIT claim it reduces its 
participation in BITs considerably; and that this effect is over and above any effect from 
observing claims against other countries. While one could think of a number of reasons we 
observe this statistical result, the underlying causal process was made clear from the 
qualitative evidence above: although in some cases developing countries may have learned 
about other countries’ experiences – either directly or via intermediaries – many failed to 
consider the risks of BITs until hit by a claim themselves.64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61
 This measure was constructed by taking the country’s outward FDI stock as a share of the total developing 
country sample outward FDI stock and calculated the maximum, average, and median shares. Top 10 from 
each were then considered large developing country capital exporters.  
62
 The one-sided nature of the t-test for our null allows us to reject the null at 5% level of significant even in 
the regression with ratification as the dependent variable.  
63
 E.g. 1-exp(-0.423)=0.34. Note that, as expected, the results are weaker when ‘ratification’ is the dependent 
variable due to the idiosyncratic differences. 
64
 Similarly, Haftel and Thompson (2012) find that while countries’ own experiences with disputes increase 
chances that they will renegotiate BITs, experiences of other countries have no such effect.  
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 Signing Ratifying Sign & Ratify 
L.BIT Claim -0.423*** -0.187* -0.463*** 
 
(0.107) (0.112) (0.144) 
L.Inward FDI -0.016 0.009 -0.030** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
L.Outward FDI -0.011 -0.006 0.016 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.020) 
L.GDP 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.071*** 0.092*** 0.067** 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) 
Constant 2.260*** 2.467*** -2.021** 
 
(0.494) (0.555) (0.885) 
Observations 1604 1524 1448 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Participation is measured by signing in column 1, ratification in column 2, and column 3 measures BITs 
signed in that year which where ratified within 3 years. Sample size varies across columns as countries for 
which dep. var. is always zero are dropped. Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, fixed effect 
estimation; standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT participation 
as well as four and ten year lags of ratification also included but coefficients not reported. All other controls 
are lagged one year. 
 
Table 3. Strong negative effect of first BIT claim on participation in BITs by 
developing countries. 
 
While our results are backed up by interviews with government officials themselves, we 
may still be concerned that the statistical correlations are driven by a tendency for first 
claims to occur after BIT-participation has already started to decline. The graphical ‘event-
study’ in Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence that – to the extent participation was 
already in decline – the first claim exaggerated this trend. Table 4 provides regression-
based evidence to further support this and thus allay the concern that our results are driven 
by spurious correlation with some underlying trend toward decreased participation. In the 
interests of space the results are presented only for signing as the dependent variable. 
Signing was chosen over ‘Signed and Ratified’ since the two measures have very similar 
results but the former is more consistent with the existing literature on BIT participation. 
Columns 1-5 in Table 4 control respectively for 2 years prior to the registration of the first 
BIT claim through to 2 years after the BIT claim is lodged. If our BIT claim dummy were 
picking up some spurious trend, we would expect all the coefficients on the different leads 
and lags of BIT claims to be similar. Instead we find that the coefficients in the year of the 
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BIT claim and the two subsequent years are roughly twice as large are those in the two 
years prior.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
F2.BIT Claim -0.134     
 
(0.098)     
F.BIT Claim  -0.158    
 
 (0.010)    
BIT Claim   -0.325***   
 
  (0.103)   
L.BIT Claim    -0.423***  
 
   (0.107)  
L2.BIT Claim     -0.302*** 
 
    (0.110) 
L.Inward FDI -0.028*** -0.018* -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 2.500*** 2.078*** 2.173*** 2.260*** 2.205*** 
 
(0.520) (0.493) (0.492) (0.494) (0.497) 
Observations 1518 1604 1604 1604 1604 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, 
fixed effect estimation; standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT 
participation as well as lags of ratification also included but coefficients not reported. All other controls are 
lagged one year. 
Table 4. Timing of significant reduction in participation coincides with first BIT 
claim 
 
Furthermore, the coefficients on BIT-claim one and two years prior (columns 1 and 2) are 
not significant at the 10% level, while the coefficients in columns 3-5 are negative and 
significant at the 1% level. These results correspond well with Figure 2 and provide strong 
evidence that the structural break in participation behavior coincides with the registration 
of the first BIT claim. 
Being confident of the robustness of our primary result, we now consider ancillary 
questions. Table 5 examines the impact of increasing numbers of claims against a host and 
of claims against countries in the same region. In all specifications in Table 5 we see that 
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the total number of BIT claims (Cum. BIT claims) is only very weakly negatively 
correlated with participation, suggesting that learning about the potential of BITs occurs 
primarily in response to the first BIT claim. This corresponds well with the predictions of 
bounded rationality, namely that a single ‘vivid’ event often has a considerably greater 
impact than expected by Bayesian frameworks. The later would predict that each 
additional claim reveals further information about the risks BITs entail, yet this is not what 
we find.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Cum. BIT Claims -0.018 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
L.BIT Claim  -0.419*** -0.416*** -0.393*** 
 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) 
L.Region BIT Claim   -0.015 0.010 
 
  (0.098) (0.097) 
L.Region cum.BIT Claims    -0.011*** 
 
   (0.004) 
L.Inward FDI -0.018* -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 2.036*** 2.253*** 2.272*** 2.808*** 
 
(0.497) (0.495) (0.509) (0.541) 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, 
fixed effect estimation; standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT 
participation as well as lags of ratification also included but coefficients not reported. All other controls are 
lagged one year. 
 
Table 5. First claim against a country matters but cumulative number of claims does 
not, while cumulative claims in the region matter and first claim does not. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 examine the response to claims against other countries in the 
same region. Interestingly the pattern is reversed here: countries show little response to the 
first claim in the region, but do seem to respond to the cumulative average number of 
claims per country in the region. This is not too surprising: claims against other countries 
in the region are likely to elicit significantly less of an emotional response for policy-
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makers than claims against their own country. Thus our result suggests that, consistent 
with theories of bounded rationality, policy learning is more ‘rational’ when the emotional 
content of the information is lower. 
Finally, Table 6 addresses the question of whether participation in ‘serious’ BITs responds 
in the same way as participation in more ‘frivolous’, or ‘photo-opportunity’, BITs. The 
perceived benefits of participation in BITs for countries can range from apparently minor 
ones such as ‘having something to do’ when a dignitary from another country visits 
through to the potential attraction of much-needed high-technology investment.65  
 (1) 
North-South 
BITs 
(2) 
South-South 
BITs 
(3)  
Serious  
BITs 
(4)  
Photo  
ops. 
L.BIT Claim -0.373** -0.257** -0.421*** -0.198 
 
(0.170) (0.125) (0.150) (0.136) 
L.Inward FDI -0.044*** -0.024* -0.030** -0.025* 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.Outward FDI -0.067** -0.018 -0.051** -0.021 
 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) 
L.GDP 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.093*** 0.063** 0.059** 0.086*** 
 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) 
Constant 3.114*** 3.186*** 2.890*** 2.974*** 
 
(0.778) (0.509) (0.664) (0.551) 
Observations 1558 1595 1558 1538 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number signed of the type of BITs described in the column heading. 
‘Serious’ BITs are either North-South BITs or South-South BITs where at least one party is a major capital 
exporter. ‘Photo-op’ BITs are South-South BITs between countries which are not major capital exporters. 
Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, fixed effect estimation; standard errors in parentheses. 
Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification also 
included but coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
Table 6. Participation in BITs with potentially significant economic implications is 
more affected by claims than participation in 'photo-opportunity' BITs. 
 
Similarly, the potential costs of BITs may appear negligible – for example if there is 
almost no inflow of FDI ever likely from the partner country – or they may be substantial – 
for example if there are substantial amounts of investment from the partner in high 
political-risk sectors. So if our results are purely driven by a slowdown in BITs with few, if 
                                                          
65
 The latter is questionable. For recent studies see Aisbett 2009, Yackee 2010, and Poulsen 2010. 
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any, considerable implications (except through the MFN clause) our analysis may have 
little relevance for the investment regime overall. Yet, Table 6 shows that this is not the 
case. While participation in all types of BITs responds negatively to a claim, the impact is 
strongest for BITs with the largest potential economic implications. 
4. Alternative explanations based on full rationality 
Our findings thus far have provided robust evidence of highly narcissistic learning about 
treaty claims - consistent with the bounded rationality framework. In this final section we 
consider the extent to which our findings might be explained using two leading alternative 
models, namely: full rationality with full information, and full rationality with imperfect 
information.  
Full rationality with full information 
 
If negotiators pursued BITs primarily in response to individual interests – e.g. larger 
budgets, facilitating travels abroad - perhaps they actually did know about the implications 
of BITs, yet the political costs of pursuing them for their selfish reasons simply became too 
high once the claims began. We find this explanation unlikely. First of all, it would have to 
rest on a major conspiracy, given that all stakeholders interviewed have stated 
independently of each other that most developing countries failed to fully consider the 
risks of BITs until they were hit by their first claim. Even some official reports and internal 
documents admit this (see above). This is important as a number of stakeholders have often 
had an individual interest in cautious BIT-strategies. These include legal officers vetting 
the treaties, whose careers could be at stake if misinforming their principals about their 
international legal obligations; finance ministries, who would often have to ‘pay the bill’ in 
case of disputes; or regulatory agencies, whose autonomy would be constrained. However, 
all feedback from officials indicated that BITs have typically been completely non-
politicized in national policy-making processes and hardly any stakeholders got involved 
in BIT-policies until the first claim hit. This is difficult to explain using a public choice 
framework.  
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Full rationality with imperfect information 
 
There is another potential explanation, however, which may intuitively carry more weight. 
If we acknowledge that some degree of learning from own experiences is indeed rational - 
even when faced with low-probability events - then bounded rational and Bayesian 
learning models may in fact be observationally equivalent.  
 
A rational stakeholder would know that the probability of a claim depends on a large 
number of factors including the investment and governance profile of the country. She 
therefore knows that a claim against her own country, or a similar (e.g. neighboring) 
country, provides more information about the probability they will face future claims than 
a claim against a more ‘distant’ country. Thus a rational but imperfectly-informed 
stakeholder would react more strongly to claims close by - and stronger still to claims at 
home - than they would to more distant claims. Thus the difference between the Bayesian 
and bounded rational learning models in this regard remains one of degree. Taking this 
logic one step further, Meseguer argues that “bounded learning and rational learning yield 
the same results as soon as one drops the rational learning assumption that there are zero 
costs to gathering new information.”66 
 
In this respect we agree with Conlisk, however, who points out that there is no inherent 
reason why information costs should be a more logical assumption than cognition costs a 
priori.67 Also, while we do not disagree with Meseguer’s conclusion of observational 
equivalence in the context of her specific case-study, we find it unlikely that a rational 
learner would react so strongly to the first claim at home while completely ignoring the 
first claim in the region, as we found in the statistical analysis. We also find it unlikely that 
a rational learner would react strongly to the first claim against their country rather than 
learning progressively from subsequent claims. Moreover, unlike Meseguer who almost 
exclusively relies on econometric evidence, we have presented interview feedback on the 
process with which developing countries have learned about BITs, which clearly indicated 
bounded rational learning. For, while it may not have necessarily violated standard 
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 Meseguer 2006, 1. 
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expected utility theory if governments underestimated the risks of BITs, only bounded 
rationality can explain why they were ignored completely.68 
 
Finally, even if this does not convince skeptics of the added-value of a bounded rationality 
framework, the bilateral nature of our case-study allows us in a last robustness test to 
provide a clear rational baseline, which other studies have had difficulties providing. 
Existing international relations literature on policy learning tends to focus on unilateral 
policy decisions involving only one country.69 Yet this provides only one dimension of 
‘relevant’ information, which in turn makes it difficult to distinguish bounded and fully 
rational learning. BITs, in contrast, are bilateral, which means that there are potentially two 
dimensions of relevance, or ‘distance’, of a piece of information: one in relation to the 
‘host’ country, and one in relation to the partner country, and on their sensitivity to this 
second dimension of distance the fully and bounded rational learners will differ even more 
than the first. Analogously to the case of closeness for the host country, a fully-rational 
policy-learner will place more weight on cases brought by investors from the potential 
BIT-partner than it will on other cases. This is rational since the probability that claims are 
brought by a certain country is likely to vary with the amount and type of outward 
investment of the country, the experience of home country lawyers in bringing BIT claims, 
etc. In contrast, a bounded rational learner may ignore the readily available information 
about BIT–claims brought by investors from the potential partner country. The availability 
heuristic will not apply in the same way as with claims against the host since claims 
brought by the partner are not as ‘vivid’. Thus, on the question of how BIT participation 
responds to claims brought by potential partner countries, bounded and full rational 
learning models are not observationally equivalent. 
 
In order to test our competing hypotheses with regard to claims brought by the potential 
partner, we make use of the datasets and empirical methodologies of the two leading 
papers on BIT-diffusion; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (EGS, 2006) and Jandhyala, 
Henisz, and Mansfield (JHM, 2011).  Both papers use country-dyad datasets and a survival 
analysis approach to examine the determinants of BIT-formation between partners. Since 
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 See again e.g.; Camerer and Kunreuther 1989. 
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 E.g. Weyland 2006; Meseguer 2009; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009. 
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the findings are so similar, and in the interests of space, we present and discuss the results 
for the EGS dataset here (see Table 7) and those for the JHM dataset in the Appendix (see 
Table A.4). Table 7 reports the estimated odds ratios for EGS’s main explanatory variable 
of interest and for our explanatory variables of interest.70  In the first column we reproduce 
EGS’ preferred regression and obtain exactly the same estimated odds ratio on their main 
variable (BITs among export product competitors) as reported in their paper.71 The odds 
ratio is greater than one, and statistically significant, which EGS interpret as evidence in 
favor of their rational, competition-driven theory of BIT-diffusion. In column 2, consistent 
with our main regressions, we restrict the sample period to post-1989 – the period in which 
BITs actually had some legal ‘bite’. We include this column to show that this change alone 
causes the odds ratio for EGS’s export competition variable to no longer be statistically 
significantly different from one.72 We are agnostic about this finding, however, as we are 
not disputing that developing countries have signed BITs primarily in an attempt to attract 
foreign investment (see Conclusion). Also, responding to behavior of “competitors” is 
potentially consistent with both fully-rational and bounded-rational learning models.  
In column 3 of Table 7 we add our “BIT-claim” explanatory variable of interest, as well as 
an unrestricted quadratic in total BITs signed by the host to control for previous BIT 
participation.  As such, column 3 tests whether our main result is robust to the use of an 
alternative dataset and entirely different econometric approach. The odds ratio on our BIT-
claim variable is 0.786 and statistically significantly different from 1. Thus, our finding 
that a BIT-claim decreases participation is robust to the use of a dyadic modeling 
approach.  
In column 4 of Table 7 we add controls for a claim by investors from the potential partner 
country, as well as an unrestricted quadratic in previous partner-country BIT signing. 
These additions further decrease the odds ratio on our BIT-claim variable, thereby 
                                                          
70
 Other variables as per the footnote to Table 7 – including all variables which are in EGS Table 2, model 2 - 
are included in the regression but results are not reported in the interest of space. Full results are available on 
the author’s websites. Note that our switch from reporting coefficients (as per earlier tables) to odds ratios 
here is in the interest of consistency with the way the results are reported in EGS. 
71
  We report results based on model 2 in Table 2, EGS.  We chose model 2 since it was empirically the 
strongest model favouring EGS’ hypothesis of competition-led diffusion of BITs. Results based on the other 
models in Table 2 are qualitatively the same and are available from the authors on request. 
72
 An odds ratio of one suggests that the variable has no effect on the survival rate (i.e. the probability of BIT 
formation at a given point in time). 
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strengthening our main claim. In contrast, the odds ratio for the variable indicating a BIT-
claim has been launched by investors from the potential partner country is greater than one 
– though this difference is not statistically significantly different from one. This is 
consistent with our prediction based on bounded rationality and again follows directly from 
the interview feedback: officials involved in investment treaty policy-making often ignored 
the readily-available information about investment claims involving other countries until 
they themselves were hit by a claim. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BITs among export product 
competitors 
1.111*** 
(0.038) 
1.026 
(0.039) 
1.013 
(0.040) 
0.967 
(0.040) 
 
BIT claim against (host)   0.786* 0.763** 
 
  (0.097) (0.095) 
BIT claim by (source)    1.017 
(0.137) 
Years included 1960-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Observations 208610 63461 61222 60083 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) from Cox proportional hazards model; standard errors in 
parentheses. Column 1 of this table reproduces the results of ‘Model 2’ of Table 2 in EGS (2006) with 
updated dataset provided by EGS. ‘BITs among export product competitors’ is defined in EGS’ article. Full 
set of controls included from EGS, but not reported. A full set of results showing coefficients for all variables 
in the regression is available from the authors’ websites. Column 2 of this table restricts EGS’ regression to 
1990-2000. Columns 3 and 4 add controls from our data for BIT participation (quadratic function) and claims 
for host and home/partner.  
 
Table 7. Using the dataset of Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (EGS) (2006) we show in 
a bilateral setting that claims against host significantly reduce likelihood of BIT-
formation while claims brought by investors from partner have no effect.  
 
Conclusion 
Developing countries have behaved ‘predictably irrational’ in the international investment 
regime. By following the availability heuristic, many have been excessively narcissistic 
when learning about the risks of BITs. Apart alerting about potential optimism bias among 
countries yet to experience their first BIT-claim, these findings could have broader 
implications. 
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First of all, unlike several earlier international relations studies on bounded rationality, we 
were able to address the important critique of Meseguer, who argues that the large degree 
of observational equivalence between bounded rationality and Bayesian models renders the 
former an unimportant complication for international relations.73 Evidence against the 
accusation of observational equivalence is mounting in economics,74 and we found clear 
evidence against it in the international relations context as well.  
Secondly, unlike in economics and political science, IPE analysts ‘... have shown 
impressive resistance to the bounded rationality literature and its implications.’75 Ours is 
one of a few studies beginning to fill this gap,76 which all beg the question of whether it is 
time to make bounded rationality a core area of interest for IPE? While of potential use for 
constructivist approaches,77 this would be closely aligned with traditional rationalist literature 
studying how governments have pursued their (self-perceived) interests to the best of their 
ability.78 But unlike contributions based on comprehensive rationality, it would do so 
taking cognitive constraints seriously. 
For instance, a standard assumption in much rationalist IPE literature is that actors loosing 
from a policy will lobby against it.79 But this didn’t happen for a long time in the 
investment regime due to information processing biases amongst stakeholders. Might this 
finding hold in other areas as well, such as the regulation of ‘fat-tailed’ risks in 
international financial markets for instance? Similarly, we have focused on the role of the 
availability heuristic, but other heuristics – such as those of representativeness and 
anchoring – could also be important in explaining systematic patterns in economic 
diplomacy.80  
Parallel observations could be made about the settlement of international economic 
disputes. Behavioral approaches have become an established tradition in (particularly 
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 Camerer 2004; Thaler 2005; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2006.  
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 Odell 2002, 178.  See also, Elms 2008.  
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 Walter and Willett 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2011, 2012.  
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 See, for instance, Herrera’s use of bounded rationality as a bridge to constructivism; Herrera 2007, ch. 2. 
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 Lake 2009, 226. 
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American) domestic legal studies,81 but have yet to be applied to adjudication under 
international economic law. But why should WTO panels, investment treaty tribunals, or 
other international adjudicative bodies not be subject to the same biasing heuristics as 
domestic courts?  
Our findings also have more specific implications for the study of the international 
investment regime. For while we have refrained from offering a general theory of BIT-
adoption in this paper, our results imply that a bounded rationality framework could 
provide important hints as to why, and how, developing countries signed BITs in the first 
place. Although not necessarily seeking to refute the claim that many capital-importing 
countries have used modern BITs in an attempt to attract or retain capital,82 a bounded 
rationality approach would query just how careful government actors have been in the 
process.83 From this perspective, negotiators and stakeholders would not be as rigorous in 
assessing potential costs and benefits as assumed in optimizing frameworks, even if it 
would appear to be in their country’s interest to do so.  
One potentially important topic in this respect is whether systematic biases in decision-
making have varied with endowment of expertise in relevant government agencies?84 As 
expertise is essentially a response to cognition costs, it is difficult to incorporate into 
theory without reference to bounded rationality.85 And while experts are also prone to 
biased judgments, their prior knowledge reduces the biasing effects of heuristics,86 which 
makes expertise a potentially important intervening factor to understand the scope 
conditions of a bounded rationality framework.87 So perhaps developing country 
governments have been more prone to biased processing of information about the 
implications of BITs than developed country counterparts with higher levels of 
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 Sunstein 2000. 
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administrative capacity. This goes also for the content – or design – of BITs; an issue we 
have left largely unexplored in this paper.  
Other extensions of our findings could follow from the fact that arbitration claims have 
made stakeholders better realize their own interests, and thus become increasingly involved 
in the BIT-adoption process. Partly as a result, governments have been less keen on signing 
the treaties and particularly hesitant about ‘serious’ - and thus potentially costly - BITs 
with capital-exporting states. This increased politicization of BITs touch on a fundamental 
question of political science, namely whether more participants in the policy-making 
process reduce the aggregate impact of individual biases?88 If they do, then bounded 
rationality insights could be less relevant for the political economy of BITs today, than in 
the past when only few officials were involved with the treaties. Yet, there is no inherent 
reason to think that cognitive constraints which are systematic would cancel out in the 
aggregate.89 And even if they do, the high turn-over in many developing country 
bureaucracies90 may make the risks of BITs gradually less ‘vivid’ for stakeholders without 
personal experience with claims in the past, and thus potentially ‘de-politicize’ the BIT-
adoption process once again.  
Whether complementing standard IPE models, or as stand-alone explanatory frameworks, 
these are important questions arising from insights on bounded rationality that future 
studies might consider. 
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APPENDIX: Statistics, econometrics and robustness tests 
Variable Description/measure Mean SD Min Max N Source 
BIT claim 1 if country has been subject to 
a BIT claim, 0 otherwise. 0.19 0.39 0 1 2740 (I) 
Cumulative 
BIT claims Cumulative BIT claims. 0.57 2.57 0 51 2740 (I) 
Signed Annual BITs signed. 1.23 2.03 0 17 2740 (II) 
Cumulative 
signed Cumulative BITs signed. 16.16 18.89 0 124 2740 (II) 
Ratified Annual BITs coming into force. 0.90 1.74 0 15 2740 (II) 
Cumulative 
ratified 
Cumulative BITs coming into 
force. 11.18 15.06 0 97 2740 (II) 
Signed and 
ratified 
Annual BITs signed which 
came into force within three 
years. 
0.73 1.55 0 15 2740 (II) 
Cumulative 
signed and 
ratified 
Cumulative BITs signed which 
came into force within three 
years. 
8.63 11.32 0 85 2740 (II) 
FDI inflows Net inflows, BOP, bn. current USD. 1.64 6.90 -4.75 148 2471 (III) 
FDI outflows Net outflows, BOP, bn. current USD. 0.44 3.21 -3.51 67.68 2101 (III) 
GDP Bn. current US USD. 56.93 197.21 0.08 4330 2494 (III) 
Investor 
protection 
Investment risk profile index 
from 0 (very high risk) to 12 
(very low risk). 
6.91 2.34 0 12 1949 (IV) 
Regional 
BIT claim 
1 if a country in same region has 
been subject to a BIT-claim, 0 
otherwise. 
0.73 0.45 0 1 2740 (I) 
Cumulative 
regional BIT 
claims 
Cumulative BIT-claims in 
region. 9.27 16.53 0 91 2740 (I) & (V) 
North-South 
BITs signed 
Annual BITs signed with 
developed countries. 0.47 0.96 0 8 2740 (II) 
South-South 
BITs signed 
Annual BITs signed with 
developing countries. 0.76 1.48 0 15 2740 (II) 
'Serious' 
BITs signed 
Annual BITs signed with 
developed countries or 
developing countries with large 
outward capital stocks. 
0.62 1.16 0 8 2740 (II) & (III) 
'Photo-op' 
BITs signed 
Annual BITs signed with 
developing countries with small 
outward capital stocks. 
0.60 1.29 0 15 2740 (II) & (III) 
Sources: (I) unctad.org/iia-dbcases, worldbank.org/ICSID, ita.law.uvic.ca, and iareporter.com; (II) 
UNCTAD; (III) IMF IFS; (IV) PRS Group; (V) UN Millennium Development Goals Regional 
Groupings.  
Notes: Sample covers 137 developing and transition economies from 1990 to 2009. 
Table A.1. Summary statistics  
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Choice of Estimator 
Since our dependent variable is a count variable, an estimator based on a gamma 
distribution is likely most appropriate. While acknowledging that there may be some 
resulting lack of efficiency compared to a simple poisson model, we have opted for a high 
degree of flexibility and estimate the fixed-effect negative binomial model of Hausman, 
Hall and Griliches.91 Furthermore, lack of efficiency is not a major concern for us as our 
coefficients of interest are generally significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
Fixed-effect estimators are the workhorse of cross-country panel applications because they 
significantly reduce the influence of omitted time-invariant country characteristics. In our 
case, relevant characteristics include factors such as region, legal tradition, geographical 
size, and colonial history. Yet, using a full fixed-effect model for our purposes may cause 
bias since the inclusion of lagged cumulative participation is akin to including a lagged 
dependent variable.92 Thus our base specification is something of a compromise, allowing 
for country-specific dispersion in a negative binomial specification, (thus allowing 
country-specific intercepts) but not being a pure fixed-effect model.93 In robustness checks 
we compare our results to those obtained in both a fixed-effect poisson model and a 
negative binomial model without country-specific dispersion. The results in Table A.2. 
indicate that our choice of estimator does not qualitatively affect our findings. 
 
Table A.2 shows the robustness of the finding to the choice of estimator from within the 
set of count-data models which could potentially be used in the application. The strong 
negative impact of a BIT claim is detected by all the estimators. From left to right the 
estimators are a standard Poisson, fixed-effect Poisson, Negative Binomial (constant 
dispersion), Hausman, Hall and Grilichies’ ‘fixed effects’ estimator (our base estimator)94, 
and a negative binomial model including country-dummies.95 
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 For a discussion, see Arellano and Honoré 2001. 
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 (1) 
Poisson 
(2) 
FE-Poisson 
(3) 
NegBin. 
(4) 
Base 
(5) 
NegBin-FE 
L.BIT Claim -0.417*** -0.343*** -0.468*** -0.423*** -0.379*** 
 
(0.101) (0.089) (0.117) (0.107) (0.139) 
L.Inward FDI -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.016 -0.028** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
L.Outward FDI -0.021 -0.015 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.025) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect 0.051* 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 
 
(0.027) (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.029) 
Constant -1.972***  -2.166*** 2.260*** -0.774 
 
(0.293)  (0.304) (0.494) (0.480) 
lnalpha   -0.482***  -1.407*** 
 
  (0.123)  (0.198) 
Observations 1632 1604 1632 1604 1632 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. See text for description of estimators. Coefficients 
and standard errors reported. Standard errors in columns 1, 3 & 5 are robust to country-level clustering. Year 
dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification also included but 
coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
Table A.2. Strong negative effect of first claim on participation is robust to choice of 
count-data estimator and treatment of country-effects. 
 
Other robustness tests 
Table A.3 shows the robustness of the strong negative impact of BIT claims on 
participation to plausible changes in the base specification. In column 1 the controls for 
FDI flows are omitted from the base specification. If BITs have some impact on FDI 
flows, it is possible that including FDI on the right hand side could bias all the coefficients 
in the regression. Furthermore, including FDI on the right hand side may cause bias due to 
non-random missing values in the FDI data. However, the economically and statistically 
insignificant difference between the coefficients on BIT claim in columns 1 and the base 
regression suggest neither endogeneity nor selection bias problems in the base regression.  
Column 2 omits all lagged BIT-participation controls. The robustness of the result here 
confirms that the negative BIT claim effect is not a spurious time-series artifact due to the 
lagged participation controls. Column 3 omits the year dummies from the base 
specification and instead includes global BIT participation and claims. As we would expect 
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the total number of BITs signed globally is positively related to participation, while the 
impact of increasing total global claims is negative. Columns 4 and 5 add to the base 
specification respectively controls for non-BIT investor-state arbitrations - i.e. with 
jurisdiction based on national investment laws or other investment treaties - and BIT 
claims where investors sought more than US$100 mio. in compensation. Controlling for 
non-BIT claims has negligible effect on the base regression. Controlling for large BIT 
claims (in column 5) substantially reduces the coefficient on all BIT claims. This makes 
sense as the coefficient on all BIT claims should now be interpreted as the response to 
small, medium or publicly unknown magnitude claims. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.BIT Claim -0.436*** -0.441*** -0.465*** -0.421*** -0.365*** 
 
(0.102) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107) (0.120) 
L.GDP 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.046** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
L.Inward FDI  -0.018* -0.010 -0.016 -0.015 
 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI  -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Global BITs   0.001***   
 
  (0.000)   
Global Claims   -0.004***   
 
  (0.001)   
L.non-BIT Claim    0.182  
 
   (0.188)  
L.Big BIT Claim     -0.169 
 
    (0.166) 
Constant 1.603*** 1.339*** 0.437** 2.234*** 2.203*** 
 
(0.434) (0.318) (0.215) (0.494) (0.495) 
Observations 1832 1604 1604 1604 1604 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, 
fixed effect estimation, standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies (except in column 3) and cubic 
function of lagged total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification (except in column 2) also included but 
coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
Table A.3. Strong negative effect of claims on participation is robust to different 
specifications, including controlling for large BIT claims and non-BIT investor 
claims. 
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Table A.4 repeats the exercise of Table 7 using the dataset from an important recent 
contribution to the literature by Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield.96 In column 1 we see 
once again that our principle finding of a strong negative impact from first claim against a 
host is robust to the use of a bilateral/dyadic modeling approach. In column 2 we add the 
variable for first claim brought by an investor from the potential host country, and once 
again see no effect from this variable. In columns 3 and 4 we make the specification 
increasingly conservative by adding first year and then host-country dummies. In all cases 
we find strong evidence that hosts decrease participation in response to the first claim 
against them, but show no response to the first claim brought by investors from the 
potential host. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BIT claim against (host) 0.621*** 0.569*** 0.651*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.055) (0.052) (0.061) (0.066) 
BIT claim by (source)  0.908 0.981 1.023 
 
 (0.081) (0.093) (0.092) 
Observations 145287 123729 123729 123729 
Quadratic in host no. of BITs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in source no. of BITs No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes 
Host country dummies No No No Yes 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Exponentiated coefficients of piecewise exponential model of BIT signing, standard errors in parentheses. 
Dataset and regression specification are exactly as per column 1 of Table 2 of JHM (2011) except for our 
extra controls as indicated in the table. A full set of results showing coefficients for all variables in the 
regression is available from the authors’ websites.  
 
Table A.4. Using the dataset of Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield (JHM) (2011), we 
see robust evidence that claims against host significantly reduce likelihood of BIT-
formation while claims by investors from partner have no effect. 
 
                                                          
96
 JHM 2011.  
   40 
 
REFERENCES 
Aaken, Anne Van. 2010. “The International Investment Protection Regime through the 
Lens of Economic Theory.” In: Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa 
Chung, and Claire Balcin, eds., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration. 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. 
Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons. 2010. “Introduction: Constructing the 
International Economy.” In: Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons, eds., 
Constructing the International Economy. Ithica: Cornell University Press. 
Aisbett, Emma. 2009. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Correlation Versus Causation. In: Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, eds., The Effect of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investments. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Allee, Todd and Clint Peinhardt. 2010. “Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions.” International 
Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1: 1-26. 
 
———. 2011. “Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on 
Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 65, no. 3: 401-432. 
Allison, Paul and Richard Waterman. 2002. “Fixed–Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
Models.” Sociological Methodology 32, no. 1: 247-265. 
Alvarez, Jose. 2011. The Public International Law Regime Governing International 
Investment. Hague: Hague Academy of International Law.  
Arellano, Manuel and Bo Honoré. 2001. “Panel data models: some recent developments.” 
In: James Heckman and Edward Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 5. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. 
“New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political 
Institutions,” World Bank Economic Review 15, no. 1: 165-176. 
Blake, Daniel. 2010. “Thinking Ahead: Time Horizons and the Legalization of 
International Investment Agreements,” working paper. 
Bubb, Ryan and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2007. “BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of 
bilateral and multilateral regulation of foreign investment.” International Review 
of Law and Economics 27: 291-311.  
Busch, Marc, Eric Reinhardt, G. Shaffer. 2009. “Does legal capacity matter? A survey of 
WTO members?” World Trade Review 8, no. 4: 559-577. 
 
Büthe, Tim and Helen Milner. 2009. “Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct 
investment.” In: Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, eds., The effect of treaties on foreign 
   41 
 
direct investment: bilateral investment treaties, double taxation treaties, and 
investment flows. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Camerer, Colin. 2004. Behavioural Game Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Camerer, Colin and Howard Kunreuther. 1989. “Decision Processes for Low Probability 
Events: Policy Implications.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 8, no. 
4:565-592. 
Camerer, Colin, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds. 2003. Advances in 
Behavioral Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Conlisk, John. 1996. “Why Bounded Rationality?” Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 
2: 669-700. 
Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), Republic of South Africa. 2009. Government 
Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review. 
 
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” International 
Organization 60, no. 4: 811-846.  
 ———. 2010. “Replication data for: Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1959-2000.” 
Elms, Deborah. 2000. “New Directions for IPE: Drawing From Behavioural Economics.” 
International Studies Review 10, no. 2: 239-265. 
Gilardi, Fabrizio, Katharina Füglister, and Stéphane Luyet. 2009. “Learning From Others: 
The Diffusion of Hospital Financing Reforms in OECD Countries.” Comparative 
Political Studies 42, no. 4: 549-573. 
Guzman, Andrew. 1998. “Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Virginia Journal of International 
Law 38, no. 4: 639-688. 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Alex Hughes and David Victor. 2011. “The Behavioral Psychology 
of Elite Decision Making: Implications for Political Science.” ILAR Working 
Paper no. 19.  
Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Brad Leveck, David Victor, and James Fowler. 2012. “A 
Behavioural Approach to International Legal Cooperation.” ILAR Working Paper 
no. 13.  
Haftel, Yoram and Alexander Thompson. 2012. “Why Do States Renegotiate International 
Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Working paper. 
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn Hall and Zvi Griliches. 1984. “Econometric Models for Count 
Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship.” Econometrica 52, 
no. 4: 909-938. 
   42 
 
Healy, Andrew and Neil Malhotra. 2009. “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy.” 
American Political Science Review 103, no. 3: 387-406. 
Herrera, Yoshiko. 2007. Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hsu, Locknie. 2006. “MFN and Dispute Settlement: When the Twain Meet.” Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 7, no. 1: 25-37. 
Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold Henisz, and Edward Mansfield. 2011. “Three Waves of BITs: 
The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 55, no. 6: 1047-1073. 
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Johnson, Eric, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros, and Howard Kunreuther. 2000. 
“Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions.” In: Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and Frames. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jones, Bryan. 1999. “Bounded Rationality.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1: 
297-321. 
Jones, Bryan and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Jupille, Jospeh and Duncan Snidal. 2005. “The Choice of International Institutions: 
Cooperation, Alternatives and Strategies.” Working paper.  
 
Kunreuther, Howard, Robert Meyer, Richard Zeckhauser, Paul Slovic, Barry Schwartz, 
Christian Schade, Mary Luce, Steven Lippman, David Krantz, Barbara Kahn, and 
Robin Hogarth. 2002. “High Stakes Decision Making: Normative, Descriptive 
and Prescriptive Considerations.” Marketing Letters 13, no. 3: 259-268. 
 
Lake, David. 2009. “Open economy politics: A critical review.” Review of International 
Organizations 4, no. 3: 219-244.  
Legum, Barton. 2006. “Defining Investment and Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim?” 
Arbitration International 22, no.  4: 521-526. 
Levy, Jack. 1994. “Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield.” 
International Organization 48, no. 2: 279-312. 
Mangklatanakul, Vilawan. 2011. “Thailand’s First Treaty Arbitration: Gain From Pain.” 
In: UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to 
Arbitration II. Geneva: United Nations. 
 
March, James. 2010. The Ambiguities of Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
   43 
 
McClelland, Gary, William Schulze, and Don Coursey. 1993. “Insurance for low-
probability hazards: A bimodal response to unlikely events.” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 7, no. 1: 95-116. 
McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Meseguer, Covadonga. 2006. “Rational learning and bounded rational learning in the 
diffusion of policy innovations.” Rationality and Society 18, no. 1: 35-66. 
 ———. 2009. Learning, Policy Making, and Market Reforms. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Montt, Santiago. 2009. State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Neale, Margaret and Max Bazerman. 1991. Cognition and Rationality in Negotiations. 
New York: Free Press. 
Odell, John. 2002. “Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy: The Nature of 
Decision Making.” In: David Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis Pauly, 
eds., Governing the World’s Money. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Parra, Antonio. 1996. “Scope of new investment laws and international instruments.” 
Dawn. October 9, 10, 11, and 12.  
 
Parlett, Kate 2011. The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and 
Change in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pinto, Pablo, Santiago Pinto, and Nicolás Stier-Moses. 2011. “Regulating Foreign 
Investment: A Study of the Properties of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Working 
paper.  
 
Poulsen, Lauge. 2010. “The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and 
Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence.” In: Karl Sauvant, ed. Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy 2009/2010. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011. Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing 
Countries, and Bounded Rationality. PhD-dissertation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 
Ranjan, Prabhash. 2012. International Investment Agreements and India's Regulatory 
Power as a Host Nation. PhD-dissertation, Kings College.  
 
Reiter, Dan. 1996. Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
   44 
 
Saban, Daniela, Flavia Bonomo, and Nicolás Stier-Moses, “Analysis and Models of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties using a Social Networks Approach.” Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389, no, 17: 3661-3673. 
Salacuse, Jeswald. 1990. “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries.” International 
Lawyer 24, no. 3: 655–75. 
Schill, Stefan. 2009. The Multilateralization of International Investment Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schneiderman, David. 2008. Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment 
Rules and Democracy’s Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Simon, Herbert. 1957. Models of Man. New York: Wiley.   
Simmons, Beth, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. “Introduction: The 
International Diffusion of Liberalism.” International Organization 60, no. 4: 781-
810. 
 
Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Bernard Corrigan, and Barbara Combs. 
2000. “Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance 
Implications.” In: Paul Slovic, ed., The Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan. 
 
Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein. 2000a. “Rating the Risks.” In: Paul 
Slovic, ed., The Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan. 
 
 ———. 2000b. “Accidental Probabilities and Seat Belt Usage: a Psychological 
Perspective.” In: Paul Slovic, ed., The Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan. 
 
Slovic, Paul, Howard Kunreuther, and Gilbert White. 2000. “Decision Processes, 
Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards.” In: Paul Slovic, ed., The 
Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan.  
 
Steinbrugge, Karl, Frank McClure and A. Snow. 1969. “Studies in seismicity and 
earthquake damage statistics.” Washington DC: United States Department of 
Commerce. 
Sunstein, Cass, ed. 2000. Behavioral Law and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Thaler, Richard, ed. 2005. Advances in Behavioral Finance, vol. 2.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1973. “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability.” Cognitive Psychology 5, no. 2: 207-232. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 1998. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s. Geneva: United Nations.  
   45 
 
 ———. 1999. Trends in International Investment Agreements: An Overview. Geneva: 
United Nations. 
 
———. 2002. Progress report: Work undertaken within UNCTAD's work programme on 
international investment agreements between the 10th Conference of UNCTAD, 
Bangkok, February 2000 and July 2002. Geneva: United Nations. 
 
 ———. 2007. Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking. 
Geneva: United Nations. 
 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). 1988. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties. New York: United Nations. 
 
Van Harten, Gus. 2007. Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 ———. 2010. “Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion.” Trade, 
Law and Development 2, no. 1: 19-58. 
Vertzberger, Yaacov. 1998. Risk-Taking and Decision Making: Foreign Military 
Intervention Decisions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Wälde, Thomas. 2005. “The ‘umbrella’ clause in investment arbitration: a comment on 
original intentions and recent cases.” Journal of World Investment & Trade 6, no 
2: 183-236. 
Walter, Stefanie and Thomas Willett. 2011. “Delaying the Inevitable: A Political Economy 
Approach to Currency Defences and Depreciation.” Review of International Political 
Economy 19, no. 1: 114-139. 
Weyland, Kurt. 2006. Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in 
Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 ———. 2009. “The Diffusion of Revolution: ‘1848’ in Europe and Latin America.” 
International Organization 62, no. 3: 391-423. 
 ———. 2010. “The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830-
1940.” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8-9: 1148-1176. 
Yackee, Jason. 2008. “Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 33, no. 2: 405-441. 
 
 
 
